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WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
a court in Illinois, against a West Virginia resident, where in
personam jurisdiction was obtained through the Illinois' "long
arm" statute. The West Virginia Court recognized that the pur-
pose of the Illinois statute is to assert jurisdiction over nonresident
defendants to the extent permitted by the due process clause of
the United States Constitution. The court then stated that he
purpose of West Virginia's "long arm" statute is in harmony with
the purpose evidenced by the Illinois statute. Another indication
that the court may give this section of the statute a liberal con-
struction is the decision in State ex rel. Coral Pools, Inc. v. Knapp.2 3
Here, the court construed the portion of West Virginia's 'long arm"
statute that provides for in personam jurisdiction over a foreign
corporation "if such corporation makes a contract to be performed,
in whole or in part, by any party thereto in this State".24 In this
case, an Ohio corporation entered into a parol contract with a
West Virginia citizen by telephone to be performed in West
Virginia. The Ohio corporation was not qualified to do business
in West Virginia, and none of its officers or agents came within
West Virginia in connection with the making or execution of the
oral agreement. The court, noting the clear trend toward ex-
panding the permissible scope of state jurisdiction over foreign
corporations, nevertheless ruled that it would not be inconsistent
with the traditional notion of fair play and substantial justice to
subject the Ohio corporation to in personam jurisdiction in West
Virginia.
In light of this decision and the statement made by the court
in the Gavenda case, it is conceivable that the Mann case would
be decided differently if it were relitigated today.
Ronald Ralph Brown
Constitutional Law-Duty to Warn Accused of Rights on Arrest
D was arrested at his home by city police officers, was taken into
custody, was interrogated for two hours at the police station, and
signed a confession involving him in kidnapping and rape. D was
not informed at the time by police or others that he had a right to
counsel, either retained or appointed. At the trial, in which the
23 147 W. Va. 704, 131 S.E.2d 81 (1963).
24 W. VA. CoDE ch. 31, art 1, § 71 (Michie 1966).
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confession was admitted in evidence, D was found guilty of kid-
napping and rape. The Supreme Court of Arizona affirmed. Held,
reversed. It is a constitutional prerequisite to the admissibility
of such statements that the suspect must, in the absence of a clear,
intelligent waiver of the constitutional rights, be warned prior to
questioning that he has a right to remain silent, and that any
statement he does make will be used against him. Miranda v.
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
In addition to the Miranda case, the Court considered three
similar cases, two from California and one from New York. Chief
Justice Warren, writing the majority opinion, concluded that, when
a person is deprived of his freedom and subjected to questioning
by the authorities,' the privilege against self-incrimination is
jeopardized; that such a person must be informed in clear and
unequivocal terms that he has a right to remain silent; that any-
thing he says can be used against him in a court of law; that the
person must be informed of his right to counsel,' and that, if he
is an indigent person, a lawyer will be appointed for him; and that
if the person manifests in any manner prior to or during questioning
he wishes to remain silent, the interrogation must cease.'
The principal case is the latest and most definitive in a long
line of cases in which the Court has dealt with the confession
problem.' The purpose of this comment is not to review those
cases, but rather to assess Miranda's effect on West Virginia law
and law enforcement practices; to consider the decision's effect
on the waiver of constitutional rights; and, finally, to note the
"new" constitutional basis for the decision. This consideration
will warrant a brief description of the Miranda setting.
In 1964 the Supreme Court in Escobedo v. Illinois held that
the accused could not be deprived of the assistance of counsel
during the interrogation stage. The Court did not there define
I The Court stated that this was what was meant in Escobedo when they
spoke of an investigation focusing on the accused. Miranda v. Arizona, 86
S Ct. 1602, 1612 n.4 (1966).
2 The Court stated that the fifth amendment privilege of counsel "com-
prehends not merely a right to consult with counsel prior to questioning, but
also to have counsel present during any questioning if the defendant so de-
sires." Miranda v. Arizona, supra note 1, at 1626.
' Miranda v. Arizona, 86 S. Ct. 1602 (1966).
4 See Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315, 321 n.2 (1959).
5 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
1966]
2
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 69, Iss. 1 [1966], Art. 7
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol69/iss1/7
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
what the interrogation stage involved. Conflicting interpretations6
in various state and federal courts in assessing the implication of
Escobedo gave rise to Miranda and its related cases. Thus the
Court's stated purpose was to explore the problems that had been
exposed in applying the fifth amendment privilege against self-
incrimination to incustody interrogation in an effort to give
"concrete constitutional guidelines for law enforcement agencies
and courts to follow."'
Recent West Virginia legislation,8 obviously enacted in response
to the Escobedo decision, appears to meet the Miranda require-
ments except in two particulars: (1) the statute does not
specifically provide that the accused is to be told of his right
to appointed counsel, (2) nor does it provide, as Miranda did,
that if the accused manifests in any manner that he wishes to re-
main silent, the interrogation must cease. Effective recognition
could be given to these additional requirements in one of several
ways. It could be accomplished by new legislation, or by promul-
gation of court rules, as is the case in Pennsylvania,9 or by practical
application on the local level. In any event the record of the
investigation must reflect the satisfaction of the several require-
ments of Miranda. It seems relatively unimportant in what manner
the court's required interrogation principles are applied and ef-
fected so long as they are satisfied. Also those who apply them
in the first instance must manifest understanding of the nature
and scope of the rights involved. A recent case, State v. Fortner,'"
decided one week before Miranda, indicates lack of application
of these principles in West Virginia. This case brings home the
urgent need for educating law enforcement officers as to the
proper procedures to be followed in incustody interrogation. In
Fortner a sheriff and his deputy interrogated the accused and
obtained a confession without first informing the accused of his
right to remain silent or his right to counsel. At defendant's trial
the confession was admitted in evidence and he was convicted.
The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia reversed the
judgment of conviction, primarily on rights guaranteed by the West
Virginia Constitution, noted to be substantially the same as pro-
6 Miranda v. Arizona, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 1610 (1966).
7 Id. at 1611.8 W. VA. CoDE ch. 62, art. 1, § 6 (Michie 1966).9 PENN. R. Crum. Proc. 116, 119, 323, 324 (1966).
10 148 S.E.2d 669 (W. Va. 1966).
[Vol. 69
3
Partain: Constitutional Law--Duty to Warn Accused of Rights on Arrest
Published by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1966
CASE COMMENTS
visions of the United States Constitution. To eliminate chances of
other incidents as in the Fortner case, prompt and effective action
should be directed toward promulgation of carefully worded
instructions and guide lines for all law enforcement officers to
follow in their incustody interrogation. It might be noted that the
Department of Public Safety and some other law enforcement
agencies have already taken steps to implement the Supreme
Court's decision by promulgation of such instructions.
Another aspect of the Miranda case which has an indirect effect
on West Virginia law, as well as the law of all states, dealt with
the waiver of the aforementioned constitutional rights. In Miranda
the Court undertook for the first time since Johnson v. Zerbst"
to consider, at least to any substantial extent, waivers of con-
stitutional privileges. The Court observed that "if the interrogation
continues without the presence of an attorney and a statement
is taken, a heavy burden rests on the government to demonstrate
that the defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his privilege
against self-incrimination and his right to retained or appointed
counsel."' 2 The Court did not attempt, however, to explain how
law enforcement officials were to ascertain whether a defendant
was knowingly and intelligently waiving his rights. The Court did
set forth three instances where a waiver of constitutional rights
would not be presumed: (1) "a valid waiver would not be
presumed simply from the silence of the accused after warnings are
given or simply from the fact that a confession was in fact
eventually obtained"; (2) nor is the privilege "waived if the
individual answers some questions or gives some information on
his own prior to invoking his right to remain silent when inter-
rogated," and (3) 'lengthy interrogation or incommunicado in-
carceration before a statement is made is strong evidence that the
accused did not validly waive his rights."'3 The Court's position
was that it was simply reasserting the high standards of proof that
11304 U.S. 458 (1938).
'Miranda v. Arizona 86 S. Ct. 1602, 1628 (1966). (Emphasis added.)
The Court's use of worcis "heavy burden" leads to some speculation as
to why the Court chose to use these words rather than the word "burden."
Recent cases (e.g. People v. Brooks, 410 P.2d 383, 388 (Cal. 1966); Oaldey
v. State 207 A.2d 472 (Md. 1965) which dealt with this problem simply
stated that the burden of proof is on the state to "rove the accused has
waived his rights. Quaere as to Mirandds effect on these and similar cases.
The use of the words "heavy burden seems to lend weight to Justice White's
arguments that the Court was not simply reasserting the standards that had
always been demanded. See note 14 infra and accompanying text.
" Miranda v. Arizona, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 1628 (1966).
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had always been demanded to prove waivers of constitutional
rights. On the other hand, a review of Mr. Justice White's dissent
leads one to believe that he considered the Court to have drastical-
ly altered the waiver standards. If fact, it would appear that he
felt the standards were so altered that, if it is claimed that an
accused had waived his constitutional rights, "the State faces
a severe, if not impossible, burden of proof." 4
This comment need not make a commitment on whether the
Court has raised the waiver standards, but need only to point
out that extra precaution is to be taken when an accused wishes
to waive his constitutional rights. If a person wishes to waive
such rights, it is incumbent on the interrogating officers to ex-
plain the nature and meaning of this waiver and its possible conse-
quences. Moreover, the interrogating officers should attempt to
ascertain whether the accused is capable of knowingly and in-
telligently waiving his rights.
An interesting aspect of the Miranda decision, not directly con-
cerned with interrogation procedures, is the purported "new
constitutional basis for that decision." In Miranda the Court
based its decision on the fifth amendment privilege against self-
incrimination, rather than the sixth amendment right to counsel,
as was the case in Escobedo. Mr. Justice Harlan referred to this
switch as a trompe roeil.'5 He was of the opinion that "historically,
the privilege against self-incrimination did not bear at all on the
use of extra-legal confessions"1 6 and that the amendment "should
properly have no bearing on police interrogation."' The Court's
change had been foreshadowed in recent years by several authors
and students who, in writing on incustody interrogation, had sug-
gested that the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination
was the basic liberty which the Court was seeking to protect.'"
These writers were of the opinion that, in essence, police inter-
rogation inevitably involved the privilege against self-incrimination
since the primary object of police interrogation is to obtain in-
criminating statements from the accused.
'4Id. at 1660 (1966).
, 1d. at 1646. Trompe l'oeil is defined as "window dressing, a piece of
bluff, or camouflage." MAuNsioN, HEATH's STArIDAn FRENCH AND 1ENoLISu
DicTnONARY (1962).6 Miranda v. Arizona, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 1646 (1966).17 Ibid.
"o SELviNcs ESSAYS ON CnmiNA, PxtoCEDURE 269 (1964). See generally
Fink, The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 16 W. Es. L. REv. 725, 727(1965).
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It can only be speculated as to how far the principal cases go
towards resolving the troublesome problems involved in incustody
interrogation. It would appear that the decision should go far in
that respect, in that, outside the area of waivers of constitutional
privileges, the Court's guide lines are fairly narrow and should
not be unnecessarily hard to apply. In the coming months Miranda
and its antecedents will provide fuel for heated discussion on the
respective rights of the community, the accused, and the police.
Hopefully, after these discussions have quieted, there will be
implanted in our criminal jurisprudence a fair and workable bal-
ance of the rights of the community, the accused, and the police,
all within the meaning and intent of the constitutional provisions.
George Lawson Partain
Constitutional Law-Establishing Student's Domicile
For Voting Purposes
A student at the University of Virginia applied for registration
to vote, alleging that he had resided in Virginia beyond the statu-
tory period and that he was no longer registered to vote in Florida.
When the application was denied by the county registrar, the
student filed a petition in the circuit court to have his right to
vote determined. The circuit court ruled that the applicant was
entitled to vote. Held, reversed. Although the Constitution of
Virginia provides that a student is not deemed to have gained or
lost his right to vote because of his status as a student, he must
satisfy the dual domiciliary requirements of presence and intention
to be entitled to vote in Virginia. The voter must show an intention
to abandon the old domicile and a corresponding intent to remain
in the new domicile for an indefinite period of time. That the
applicant did not have such intention was indicated by his testi-
mony that he had no definite plans to remain in Virginia, his
payment of out-of-state tuition and his failure to show that he
was no longer registered in Florida. Kegley v. Johnson, 147 S.E.2d
735 (Va. 1966).
In order to vote in a new election district, the prospective voter
must establish a domicile in the election district in which he
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